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Abstract
Evaluation of teacher performance is usually done with the use of ratings
made by students, peers, and principals or supervisors, and at times, selfratings made by the teachers themselves. The trouble with this practice
is that it is obviously subjective, and vulnerable to what Glass and
Martinez call the “politics of teacher evaluation,” as well as to
professional incapacities of the raters. The value-added analysis (VAA)
model is one attempt to make evaluation objective and evidenced-based.
However, the VAA model—especially that of the Tennessee Value
Added Assessment System (TVAAS) developed by Dr. William
Sanders—appears flawed essentially because it posits the untenable
assumption that the gain score of students (value added) is attributable
only and only to the teacher(s), ignoring other significant explanators of
student achievement like IQ and socio-economic status. Further, the use
of the gain score (value-added) as a dependent variable appears hobbled
with the validity threat called “statistical regression,” as well as the
1
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problem of isolating the conflated effects of two or more teachers. The
proposed variance partitioning analysis (VPA) model seeks to partition
the total variance of the dependent variable (post-test student
achievement) into various portions representing: first, the effects
attributable to the set of teacher factors; second, effects attributable to the
set of control variables the most important of which are IQ of the student,
his pretest score on that particular dependent variable, and some
measures of his socio-economic status; and third, the unexplained
effects/variance. It is not difficult to see that when the second and third
quanta of variance are partitioned out of the total variance of the
dependent variable, what remains is that attributable to the teacher. Two
measures of teacher effect are hereby proposed: θ 1 for proportional
teacher effect and θ 2 for direct teacher effect.
The Need for an Objective Teacher Evaluation
There is an obvious need for objective teacher evaluation. First, on equity
considerations, there is a need to establish a direct link between teacher productivity and
teacher compensation. Clearly, it should be the case that the more productive teachers
should be paid more and/or should be given priority for promotion. Or, by the same
token, the teaching laggards will have to be considered first for compulsory retraining or
even dismissal, if the law allows. Second, on optimality grounds, there is a need on the
part of the school administrator to deploy his teachers in the teaching of courses where
they can demonstrate their utmost competencies—or, in the language of the economist,
where their largest respective marginal productivities lie. For example, if it is shown that
a mathematics teacher is more productive in the teaching of, say, algebra than in
geometry, then the Pareto principle of optimality would dictate that said teacher, ceteris
paribus, would have to teach algebra instead of geometry. Consequently, on the whole,
the school will then tend to move to a higher level of productive optimality. And, third,
it makes significant political sense that the school administration is perceived to be fair
and impartial in the assignment and compensation of teachers. Obviously, this will
minimize the occurrence of distractive uncooperativeness or at times even destructive
resistance on the part of the teachers.
What’s Wrong With the Traditional Practice of Teacher Evaluation?
Teacher evaluation is essentially and almost always done with the use of ratings
made by students, peers, and principals or supervisors, and at times, self-ratings made by
the teachers themselves. The trouble with this evaluation scheme is that it is obviously
subjective and vulnerable to the quirks and frailties of the raters, not to mention their
professional incapacities. For example, what sense can one make of a principal whose
professional specialization is English and then observing and suggesting that the
mathematics teacher handle, say, quadratic equations in this or that way? Or, what if the
principal, for one reason or another, simply dislikes the teacher? Indeed, these
occurrences, as well as those described in Glass & Martinez (1993).
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The traditional practice is teacher-centered in that it uses ratings about traits and
behavioral patterns of the teacher, rather than those about the students. Of course,
students are the reasons for existence of schools and teachers; and therefore, whatever
happens or not happens about them in the name and process of teaching should be the
basis of measuring the effectiveness of said process.
Implicit in the traditional scheme are some global and commonly accepted but
essentially unvalidated assumptions about teacher traits and behavior, such as: (1) teacher
performance is a monotonic increasing function of educational attainment and/or
professional seminars and in-service trainings undertaken, and (2) there is a standard
teacher classroom behavior against which individual teacher behavior is measured.
In regard to the first, there is no convergence of evidence showing that the more
highly educationally qualified teachers are more effective in the classroom. The second
is simply heroic. What is that standard behavior? Does it make empirical sense—and, if
so, in all or what subject areas? Who should define this behavioral pattern? The
principal or a professional body? On what light would they do that? That of revelation
(dogma) or that of science? By the way, what is the nature of teaching? Is it art or
science? If it is art, then why can’t we just leave the individual teacher alone to his own
artistic devices? On the other hand, if it is science, where then is that unambiguous
corpus of scientific knowledge that predicts with great probability that, say, this
particular teacher behavior will produce this much of this type of student achievement
within this length of time? In this age of post-Einsteinian relativity (e.g., supersymmetry
and superstrings are on the horizon), does it make sense to consider the nature of
teaching as deterministic as that?
In any event, the traditional practice also moves against the flow of professional
autonomy of the teacher who is licensed by the state to practice his profession. This is
anchored on the academic freedom of the teacher, which apparently is now a well-settled
and universally accepted principle.
The Value-Added Analysis: Is This a Valid Attempt at Objectivity?
The value-added model of teacher evaluation seeks to isolate the additional
learning (the value added) that is presumed to have occurred at the end of a teachinglearning cycle, say, at the end of a term or school year—and, by some mode of
reasoning, attribute this increment to the teacher.
Ernest Pascarella (1986) described this model as attempting to separate the net
effects of instruction from previous ability or simple maturation. He suggested ways to
improve value-added assessment, namely: cross-sectional research design, methods of
estimating the effect of a particular learning experience independent of students’
pre-learning differences, multiple regression analysis, analysis of joint or redundant
effects not directly attributable to instruction, and the development of causal models.
(ERIC CD-ROM, 1985-1998). Likewise, he noted the possibility that not all students
may benefit equally from the same experience. This is a reality that always happens in the
classroom, and apparently this is something that the value-added model is unable to
capture.
In 1998, Jill Berlin Slack and Edward P. St. John used a variant of the valueadded model—the sequential analysis—to examine the association of specific factors to
test score improvement. Among others, their findings showed the significant impact of
age, gender, school environment, and curriculum and instruction on improvement.
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However, their most consistent and significant finding is that “higher ability students
were less likely to improve than lower ability students.” They argued that this finding is
consistent with the Accelerated Schools philosophy that “disadvantaged” students stand
the most to gain from innovative teaching approaches. (ERIC CD-ROM, 1985-1998)
The Tennessee Value Added Assessment System (TVAAS) is arguably the most famous
of such assessment systems. It was designed and operationalized by Dr. William
Sanders, acknowledged by many as the value-added analysis guru. He claims that by
carefully tracking student progress over time—with his “mixed-model” statistical
methodology—he can gauge student academic performance—and the teacher effect on
that performance—that is more accurate and fair than earlier measures.
Apparently, however, Dr. Sanders has not cared to publish a complete and
detailed description of his model (other researchers are encouraging him to do so in a
refereed journal), so we rely on how others describe his model and/or his own general
description of his model. For example, Jeff Archer (1999) describes Sanders’ approach
as follows:
While other researchers have spent years struggling to control for
differences in students’ backgrounds—such as family income and
parents’ educational levels—Mr. Sanders lets each student act as his or
her own control. To do that he focuses on gains, instead of raw scores,
so that each student’s performance is compared not with that of similar
students, but against his or her own past performance. The tool he uses
is called mixed-model methodology. Though written into the Tennessee
school code, its exact operation is nearly incomprehensible to a
layperson. (1999 Editorial Projects in Education, Vol. 18, Number 34,
pp 26-28)
It appears that Sanders attempted an improvement on traditional statistics, that
is, an improvement on conventional trend or time-series analysis. Is it a multivariate
analogue of a simple or even an interrupted time-series analysis? If so, how many time
intervals are included in his model? Did he say more or less three years? Would that be
adequate enough to yield a valid analysis?
Anyway, consider the following example as mentioned by Archer. If a teacher
taught just one student for one year and that student made poor progress, then
traditional statistics would predict that the teacher’s next student would falter as well.
However, on the other hand, Sanders’ mixed-model would take that single result and
predict that the next student would make gains that would only be slightly worse than
the average for all the teachers’ students.
Archer described the mixed-model as that involving a weighting of results based
on how much information is available. He further described the statistical algorithm as a
“magic” called “shrinkage estimation,” and what it yields is called a Best Linear Unbiased
Predictor (BLUP).
Sanders’ BLUP—Magical, Mystical. We may grant that Sanders’ BLUP is a
magical algorithm—but, at least for now, its magic appears far too mystical to be clearly
understood and appreciated by those directly concerned—the ordinary classroom
teachers and/or school principals. Indeed, he owes it to the interested readers—the
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scientific community at large—to publish a clear description of what is reported to be his
claim as the “best” estimate of the teacher effect on student achievement.
In view of the absence of a clear description of how he mixed the ingredients, as
it were, of his mixed-model, we now speculate and interpret Sanders’ model as follows.
Let us ask some basic questions, but first let us lay down some basic premises
consistent with what are reported to be such ingredients. Well, first, he tracks student
progress over time, presumably to assemble a set of time-series data consisting of a finite
temporal chain of discrete incremental values (value-added quantities). Second, the
student acts as his own control—allegedly controlling for vital background factors such
as family income and parents’ educational levels (as reported by Archer). With the data
thus assembled, let, say, delta 10th be the observed value-added of student X for the last
(10th) stage in, say, a 10-stage learning cycle. Then the BLUP algorithm is applied,
weighting into account as much relevant available information as possible. And bingo,
the BLUP of the teacher effect on student X’s achievement—presumably a portion of
delta 10th—comes to the fore.
Now, what nonzero weights would Sanders assign to such relevant information
as family income and parents’ educational levels? Would the weights partake of the
nature of Bayesian probabilities? Anyway, there appears to be the necessary implicit
assumption that BLUP must always be less than delta 10th; otherwise, if he should
assume equality, then the weights of all the other background factors would each be
reduced to a nullity—contrary to an implied premise of his algorithm—and, of course,
contrary to the weight of empirical evidence. At any rate, it would be much too
unrealistic and utterly counterintuitive for him to posit that the whole of delta 10th is
determined by just one and only one factor—the teacher.
Further, in light of available literature, why is there no explicit mention of two
other factors which are probably more important, namely: the intelligence quotient (IQ)
and the learning or cognitive state of student X at the beginning of the 10-stage cycle
(pretest score). If these are included in the available “relevant information,” then again,
what would be their subjective weights? And by how much would delta 10th be further
adjusted downward because of said weights? Does he also assume that family income,
parents’ educational levels, and the other available relevant information are invariant
over time?
If the unit of analysis is a student or a cohort of students undiminished by
attrition, it may be granted that IQ is invariant over time (although the basic question
remains, what is the effect of that invariant IQ), but then what about the other relevant
factors? For example, what happens if the parents’ educational levels increase, say, at the
end of the 8th stage of the cycle? Is the BLUP algorithm designed to handle such
intertemporal variations of some relevant covariates? Also, what about the effect of
maturation on the part of the student? In short, why did he purposely exclude factors
like IQ, family income, and parents’ educational attainment—or equivalently, assume the
same to be constant—factors which time and again appear in the literature as
significantly impinging upon student achievement?
In a related vein, Sherman Dorn (see Glass, 1995) mentions a number of
problems afflicting the value-added assessment system, the most important of which
apparently vitiates the gain score (value added) as a basis for statistical analysis. Dorn
pursues the point as follows:
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“A gain score is a questionable basis for statistical analysis. Gain
scores conflate the effects of two different teachers. VAA may
seriously underestimate the effects of prior knowledge, social
background, etc. Would the effects be different if you put in sex,
race, economic class, perhaps a square of last year’s scores, in the
equation? I bet no one knows.”
Glass, on the same occasion, further drives home the point as follows:
“Now imagine—and it should be no strain on one’s imagination to do
so—that we have Teacher A and Teacher B and each has had the
pretest (Sept) achievement status of their students impeccably
measured. But A has a class with average IQ of 115 and B has a class
average IQ 90. Let’s suppose that A and B teach to the very limit of
their abilities all year long and that, in the eyes of God, they are
equally talented teachers. We would surely expect that A’s students
will achieve much more on the posttest (June) than B’s. Anyone
would assume so; indeed, we would be shocked if it were not so.”
Indeed, there are many questions in need of answers, and there may be more that
are needed to be asked, not to mention a number of other possible assumptions and a
slew of other subjective weights (probabilities). There is small wonder then that
according to Dorn “VAA is not an evaluation system accessible to teacher
understanding.” Indeed, the crucible where Sanders mixed the ingredients of his mixedmodel recipe appears much too mystical and cryptic.
Are There Flaws and/or Weaknesses of a Value-Added Model? We may
grant that Sanders had the foresight and wisdom to anticipate and adequately factor into
his model all such aforementioned questions, assumptions, and subjective weights; but it
is not clear from the available literature how he handled what apparently are some
possible flaws and/or weaknesses of such a value-added model.
In fact, woefully, instead of meeting head-on the straightforward and pointed
remarks of Dorn and Glass, he dished out arcane technical jargon and asserted tangential
generalities as follows:
We do not even calculate simple gains. For example, we use the whole
observation vector for each child over all subjects and grades. This
approach is superior to traditional multivariate approaches. As we apply
these approaches in the context of the estimation of the teacher and
school effects on the academic growth of populations of students, we
take advantage of the prior knowledge of the distribution of the
variance-covariance structure among populations of teachers, as well as
the variance-covariance structure among students.
Regardless, first, the value-added model (using gain scores) appears flawed with
the methodological threat to internal validity called “statistical regression.” This is the
phenomenon wherein larger incremental values (value-added quantities) are observed on
administration of post-test among students with lower pretest scores than those with
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higher pretest scores. Apparently, this was what Pascarella referred to when he noted, as
stated earlier, the possibility that not all students may benefit equally from the same
experience. Ironically and in fact, Sanders himself noticed this phenomenon which he
called “shed patterns.” Unfortunately, wittingly or unwittingly, he apparently chose to
ignore the significance of this phenomenon. In this respect, Archer reported about
Sanders’ observation, thus:
In many urban schools, he has noticed a pattern in which students with
the lowest past performance make the greatest gains, but those who
start with high scores make little headway. A graph of such gains
against past performance creates a downward sloping line from left to
right. He calls these “shed patterns.” (1999 Editorial Projects in
Education, Vol. 18, Number 34, pp 26-28)
This phenomenon probably underpinned the apprehension articulated by Tom
Mooney, president of the Ohio Federation of Teachers, as reported by Willard and
Oplinger (2003), about the use of a value-added model in the evaluation of teachers. It
was reported that Mooney did not want to use a value-added approach to the evaluation
of Ohio teachers because the same “could divide teachers as they try to avoid hard-toeducate children.” If, in fact Sanders failed to account for this phenomenon in his
algorithm, then indeed that weakness would eventually be translated into the behavior of
teachers trying hard to avoid low IQ or slow-learning students. (Willard, Dennis J. and
Doug Oplinger. “’Value-added analysis’ credits school districts for progress a student
makes,” Columbus, Ohio: Beacon Journal; May 26, 2003).
This problem is essentially related to that posed by the likelihood that this
phenomenon may yield the spurious conclusion that an observed incremental value is
significant, when in fact it may just be a statistical artifact. The fundamental question is
then asked: which is indicative of greater teacher productivity, the larger gains that may
arise from the lower pretest scores or the smaller gains that may arise from the higher
pretest scores? Or, by the same token, which is indicative of greater productivity:
smaller increments arising from low-IQ students or larger increments arising from highIQ students.
There are two possible answers to this question, depending on the underlying
assumption. If the unrealistic assumption is made that the entire value-added (gain score) is
caused by the teacher and only by the teacher (apparently this is Sanders’ basic
assumption but which we deem it much too heroic), then the larger gains arising from
the lower pretest scores or those arising from high-IQ students would certainly be
indicative of greater teacher productivity.
On the other hand, if the realistic assumption is made that only a portion of that
value-added (gain score) is causally attributable to the teacher, then it is possible that—
after isolating the effects of the relevant non-teacher factors, including but not limited to
IQ and the pretest scores—the smaller gross gains arising from the higher pretest scores
or those arising from low-IQ students would yield proportional net gains, possibly even
larger net gains—thereby truthfully indicating greater teacher productivity.
To belabor the point, an analogous though exaggerated question is asked: which
is more productive of energy, splitting a massive log into smaller pieces of firewood or
splitting just one extremely smaller uranium atom?
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The second weakness of a value-added approach—particularly that of Sanders—
appears to be that it cannot get away from the constraints imposed by current theory and
practice of teaching, especially the concomitant difficulty of measurement. This
difficulty arises because, as herein above described by Archer, it involves a weighting
procedure depending on “how much information is available.” This means that the
BLUP should be more valid if there is so much more information made available. This
consequently begets the fundamental question: what are the bits and pieces of
information that are available—and perhaps more importantly, what are those that
should be made available that were not factored into the estimation of Sanders’ BLUP.
For instance, what are the other teacher factors that are embodied in the teacher and
therefore necessarily inputted into the teaching-learning process that produce a desired
incremental value but were not captured by the BLUP?
In view of the fact that there is a great and bewildering multiplicity and
indeterminacy of both observable and unobservable teacher factors, then the task of
identifying which to conceptualize and to measure, aside from the few that are being
traditionally used in research, should in fact be attended with mind-boggling difficulties.
The intangible and unobservable teacher traits like desires, motivations, attitudes, values,
philosophies, fears, anxieties, emotions, affections, dreams, mania, native abilities, etc.,
etc., etc. are particularly difficult to handle. What about their behavioral patterns in the
classroom? Their teaching styles and techniques? Their physical appearance and
dressing style? What about their patterns of social interactions—professional, family,
marital or even extra-marital relationships? What about their religious convictions?
Indeed, what about an almost infinity of other teacher-related factors?
The third apparent weakness has something to do with practical considerations.
In addition to what has been mentioned earlier on, Lynn Olson (1998) reported that
many worry about the complexity of the statistical techniques used, thus making the
value-added approach vulnerable to misunderstanding by the public at large, particularly
the parents and the taxpayers. Olson elaborated that “public support is considered a
crucial element of accountability efforts, and states and districts have long been criticized
for using language and statistics that confuse, rather than enlighten.” Likewise, she cited
the ambivalent description of Carol Ascher, senior research scientist at the Institute for
Education and Social Policy, New York University, about the features of a value-added
approach to teacher evaluation, thus: “As an idea, it’s very appealing. It feels very
progressive. It feels fair. But the execution of it is so problematic.” (Olson, Lynn. “A
Question of Value,” Education Week on the Web; May 13, 1998).
The Variance-Partitioning Analysis (VPA) Model: Conceptual
And Methodological Advantages
It appears that the attempt at crafting an objective teacher evaluation scheme in
the context of an input-oriented and/or teacher-centered framework is fraught with
conceptual, methodological, and measurement difficulties. More importantly, the
purported measure of teacher effect constructed therefrom appears untenable on closer
scrutiny.
We instead propose a variance-partitioning analysis (VPA) model in the context
of an output-oriented and student-centered evaluation model. The concept appears
elegant in its simplicity. There is a pie, as it were, that represents the total variance of a
set of achievement scores on a particular dependent variable or criterion. This pie is
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then partitioned into various angular portions representing: first, the effects attributable
to the set of teacher factors; second, effects attributable to the set of control variables
the most important of which are IQ of the student, his pretest score on that particular
dependent variable (criterion), and some measures of his socio-economic status like
family income and/or the occupations and educational attainments of his parents; and
third, the unexplained effects or unexplained variance.
This proposed model (VPA) takes into account the discomfort, at least, of Glass
and Dorn about the non-inclusion of relevant and significant covariates like student IQ,
pretest scores, and some socio-economic variables. On the occasion of the
aforementioned Internet Discussion of the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System
(Glass, 1995), Dorn instructively asserts, thus:
“…entering the prior years’ scores as covariates solves the problem.
Solving Glass’ conundrum means that one assumes a linear relationship
between first set of scores and second set of scores, but that’s much
more tenable than assuming an expected gain that’s constant across the
distribution of first sets of scores.”
Further, it takes into account the suggestions made earlier by Pascarella that
multivariate analysis of covariance be used on cross-sectional data. Likewise, it is not
difficult to see that this VPA model should not be infirmed with the major flaws and/or
weaknesses of the value-added approach as described earlier on, including that which
induces teachers to avoid hard-to-teach or low-IQ students.
So, let evaluation be student-centered. Shift the focus of evaluation from teacher
traits and behavior to what fundamentally matters—that is, student achievement.
Pending the appearance and wide acceptance of a better alternative, let traditional
cognitive achievement tests measure student achievement. And by making the class the
unit of analysis, cross-sectional data on the component students are thereby available and
to be used in a manner consistent with Pascarella’s suggestion.
The beneficial effect of an output-oriented (achievement-oriented) evaluation
model stems from the fact that the teacher is at liberty to use his individual creativity and
artistry—on top of the indications of scientific knowledge—to do and to act in a manner
consistent with what he thinks is best in the classroom. The teacher is thus empowered
in the classroom as he must be. In this connection, Sanders and Horn (1995)—quite
acceptably this time—state as follows:
By focusing on outcomes rather than the process by which they are
achieved, teachers and schools are free to use whatever methods prove
practical in achieving student academic progress.
The VPA may be done in a way outlined hereunder as follows:
Consider the basic variance equation:
σY2 = σ X2 + σU 2 ;

(Equation 1)

where σY2 = total variance of student achievement (post-test
criterion scores);
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σX2 = explained variance attributable to the set of independent
variables measured, specified, and included in the analysis; and
σU2 = unexplained variance attributable to all the other variables
not included in the analysis.
In light of experience and practical reality, σX2 (explained variance) can be
broken down into:
σT2 = the variance attributable to all the known and unknown, as well as
the observed and unobservable factors (traits) that are embodied in
the teacher (teacher variance); and
σC2 = the variance attributable to the control variables the most
important of which are the student’s intelligence quotient (IQ), the
student’s socio-economic status (mainly indicated by family income
or alternatively by the proxy variables: parents’ occupation and
parents’ educational attainment), and pre-learning achievement level
(pretest score).
By definition, it is presented that θ1 = σT2 + σU2 ;

(Equation 2)

where θ 1 stands for “proportional teacher effect.”
Thus, the basic variance equation (Equation 1) may now be rewritten as:
θ1 + σC2 = σY2 .

(Equation 3)

By transposition, this reduces to:
θ1 = σY2 – σC2 ,

(Equation 3.1)

By definition, it is also presented that:
θ2= σ Y2 – σ C2 – σU 2 ,

(Equation 3.2)

where θ 2 stands for the estimated teacher variance or “direct
teacher effect.”
The basic properties of θ1 or θ2, which can be inferred from the
aforementioned equations, which are listed as follows:
1. θ 1 appears to be inversely proportional to the magnitude of the variance
attributable to the control variables (σC2).
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2. Holding constant the variance attributable to the control variables, θ 1 is always
greater than θ 2; except in the limiting case where the unexplained variance is
zero, where they are equal.
3. If the magnitude of the unexplained variance (σU2) is held constant and if the
variance explained by a given set of control variables (σC2) is taken into
account, θ 1 and/or θ 2 appears directly proportional to the portion of student
achievement variance (σY2) that is causally attributable to the teacher.
θ 1 or θ 2 is a catch-all indicator showing the combined proportional or direct
effect of any and all observable and unobservable traits of the teacher that have
something to do with the teaching-learning process. This is something that an inputoriented model or a value-added model like that of Sanders apparently cannot do.
Now, the fundamental question is asked: can we validly use the θ values to
compare the teaching performance of a teacher versus any other teacher? The answer
is a cautious yes, depending upon the magnitudes of the unexplained variance across
the units of analysis (classes). If the magnitude fluctuates wildly across the units of
analysis (across teachers or classes), then its validity is probably impaired.
Thus, the validity of the VPA and that of the calculated θ’s appear to be
dependent upon the realism of the assumption that the magnitude of the unexplained
variance remains essentially homogeneous across the units of analysis. Now, is this
assumption realistic? Apparently the answer is yes.
Let us examine the characteristics of a typical school setting. Teachers or
classes are usually grouped into various departments along disciplinal lines.
Departmental examinations are usually administered, thus to a certain extent
homogenizing the magnitude of the unexplained variance. Teachers and/or students
are subjected to the same administrator, same set of departmental curricula, the same
administrative policies and procedures, and the same departmental learning resources
and facilities; thus further homogenizing said magnitude. Therefore, within a
disciplinal department, it is quite realistic to erect the assumption that the magnitude
of the unexplained variance remains constant across teachers and/or classes.
Quite understandably, realism is diminished if the analysis is extended beyond
the boundaries of a disciplinal department and/or across course categories. Two
difficulties emerge. First, there is the difficulty posed by the different criterion scores
arising from different course categories. Second, there is the problem posed by the
perceived differential difficulties in the teaching and learning of the various course
categories. In regard to the first, standardizing the scores appears to be the only
curative procedure. In regard to the second, subjective weights reflective of the
perceived or felt differential difficulties of teaching or learning the various courses
can be factored into the algorithm. Perhaps they can be used to make adjustments to
the calculated θ values. However, careful thought is needed, since doing so is likely to
invite the risk of contaminating the inherent objectivity of the algorithm. At any rate,
the standardization of the criterion scores is also probably useful in this regard.
The specification of the algorithm according to the specific conditions of a
peculiar institutional setting, the calculation of the θ values, the guidance of some
underpinning principles, and the caveats that must be borne in mind are explained in
detail in a separate technical document. The interested reader—particularly the
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school administrator who is desirous to use the VPA—may contact this writer at his
E-mail address: ealicias@mla.nsclub.net.
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